

**SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS
(ENG508)**

(Lesson 23 to 43)



VIRTUAL UNIVERSITY OF PAKISTAN

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1. The term **Implicature** accounts for what a speaker can **imply, suggest or mean**, as distinct from what the speaker literally says (Grice, 1975).
2. Implicature - “any meaning conveyed **indirectly or through hints**, and understood implicitly without ever being explicitly stated” (Grundy, 2000).
3. Implicature covers the family of verbs such as ‘**imply, suggest, mean**’, which refer to the meaning of an utterance as understood in a given context.
4. **British** language philosopher, **Paul Grice** (1913- 1988), made remarkable contributions to the field of **pragmatics**
5. Implicatures are **context** dependent.
6. **Conversational Implicature** is implied by the speaker in making an utterance; it is part of the content of the utterance; it does not contribute to direct (or explicit) utterance content, and it is not encoded by the linguistic meaning of what has been uttered.
7. Sara: *will you eat some of this chocolate cake?* Anna: *I’m on a diet.* is an example of **Conversational** implicature.
8. GCI stands for **generalized conversational implicature**
9. In generalized conversational implicature - “**no special background knowledge** of the context of utterance is required in order to make the necessary inferences” Yule, 1996
10. GCI is a conversational implicature that is inferable **without reference** to a special context.
11. John walked **into a house** yesterday and saw a tortoise is an example of GCI. (understood that this is not John’s house)
12. A scalar implicature is a **quantity implicature** based on the use of an informationally weak term in an implicational scale.
13. Scalar implicatures arise in examples e.g. ‘**Some** professors are famous’
14. Classic examples of scales implicatures include **numerals modals and adjectives**
15. **PCI** stands for Particularized conversational implicatures.

16. Particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs) are the inferences which are worked out while drawing **totally on the specific context** of the utterance.
17. In **PCIs** most of the time, our conversations take place in a **very specific context** in which locally recognized inferences are assumed (Yule, 2002).
18. **Cancellability** is one of the properties of conversational implicature. It is also known as **defeasibility**.
19. A conversational implicature is attached to the **semantic content** of what is said, not to the linguistic form i.e. it is possible to use a synonym and keep the implicature intact.
20. Speakers try to convey conversational implicatures and hearers are able to understand them suggests that implicatures are **calculable**.
21. Conventional implicature **is not based on the cooperative principle** or the maxims.
22. Conventional implicature **do not have to occur in a conversation** (but in context). They do not depend on special contexts for their interpretation.
23. Conventional implicature are **associated with specific words** that result in additional conveyed meanings when used. The English conjunction '**but**' is one of these words.
24. English words such as '**even**' and '**yet**' **also have conventional implicatures**.
25. Conventional implicature **do not make any contribution to truth conditions**.
26. Conventional implicature is **associated with speaker or utterance** rather than a sentence.
27. Conventional implicatures are an **arbitrary part of the meaning**, and must be learned 'ad hoc'.
28. Conventional implicatures **are not calculable** via any natural procedure but are rather given by convention, thus they **must be stipulated**.
29. Strong implicature is a communicated implication of an utterance which is the **main communicative point** of the utterance.
30. Strong implicature is implicature that is **related directly by the spoken utterances**
31. Strong implicature is that premises and conclusions which the hearer is strongly encouraged but not actually forced to supply.
32. Weak Implicature is a communicated implication of an utterance which **is not by itself the main communicative point** of the utterance.
33. Weak implicature is the weaker the encouragement, and the wider the range of possibilities among which the hearer can choose, the weaker the implicatures. For example, *John: What are you planning to do today? Mary: I'm tired.*

34. Any linguistic form that we use to accomplish the task of ‘pointing out’ is called **deixis expressions**.
35. When you notice a strange object and ask, ‘What is that?’, you are using a **deictic expression** (that) to indicate something in the immediate context.
36. Deixis is also called **indexical expressions**.
37. The function of indexical expressions is to tell us where to look for a **reference**.
38. Reference is mostly related to a particular **person, place or time**.
39. Deixis is also known as the ‘**Indexicality of language**’ as it operates as indexes of specific meaning in a context.
40. **Spatial** deixis include (here, there, this, that)
41. **Temporal** deixis include (now, then)
42. **Person** deixis include (you, me, she, him)
43. Spatial deixis are used to indicate the **relative location of people and things**.
44. Spatial deixis is also known as ‘**place deixis**’.
45. Some **pure place deictic** words are: **here and there** (adverbs); **this and that** (demonstrative pronouns).
46. Pragmatic basis of spatial deixis is actually **psychological** distance.
47. **Physically close** objects will tend to be treated by the speaker as **psychologically close**.
48. Sometimes, speaker marks physically distant thing, generally, as psychologically distant e.g. **that man over there**.
49. A speaker may also mark something **physically close as psychologically distant** e.g. (a perfume being sniffed by the speaker) ‘I don’t like **that**’.
50. Person Deixis an expression used to **point to a person** (me, you, him, them) is an example of person deixis.
51. Person deixis operates on a basic **three part division**, exemplified by the pronouns for first person (“I, me, mine”), second person (you, your, yours), and third person (he, she, it).
52. A **speech event includes at least two persons**: First person = speaker and Second person = addressee.
53. Usually, the **third person is not grammatically marked**, because the only two persons of importance are the first person and the second person.
54. There is an **exclusive** ‘we’ where speaker plus other(s), excluding addressee.
55. **Inclusive** ‘we’ include speaker and addressee included.

56. The **inclusive-exclusive** distinction may also be noted in the difference between saying.
57. ‘Let’s go’ (to some friends), The action of going is **inclusive**
58. ‘Let us go’ (to someone who has captured the speaker and friends), but The action of going is **exclusive**
59. **Social deixis** may include social class, kin relationship, age, sex, profession, and ethnic group.
60. Social deixis refers to expressions which clearly **encode social meaning**. “Address terms” i.e. social status is indexicalized through the linguistic terms, for example, ‘**Madam**’, ‘**Sir**’, ‘**Professor**’, ‘**Doctor**’.
61. Social relations concern the relation **between the speaker and the addressee**.
62. **Temporal** deixis is also known as ‘**time** deixis’.
63. Temporal deixis is concerned with the encoding of the **temporal points and spans relative to the time at which an utterance is produced** in a speech act (Huang, 2014).
64. Temporal deixis includes **time adverbs** e.g. now, then, soon, last week, today, tonight, yesterday, tomorrow, etc.
65. Temporal deixis ‘Now’ indicates **both** the time coinciding with speaker’s utterance and the time of the speaker’s voice being heard.
66. Temporal deixis ‘then’ **applies to both past and future**, time relative to the speaker’s present time.
67. Temporal deictic expressions e.g. yesterday, next week, last week etc. **depend for the interpretation on knowing the relevant utterance time**.
68. **Discourse** deixis is also called **text** deixis.
69. According to Lyons (1977); Fillmore (1997); Diessel (1999), discourse deixis can be said to refer to **propositions**.
70. Deictic Reference is the **use of gestures or other means of pointing to specify an ambiguous** utterance, for instance,
71. pointing at a place in a map and saying “**here**.” such property of language is called ‘**indexicality**’
72. **Deictic Center** is when we hear a deictic, we typically make a number of assumptions about the context. The **default deictic center is the speaker’s location** at the time of utterance.
73. Thus the pronouns ‘you’ and ‘me’ and ‘us’ are semantically empty tokens in the sense that they **lack** descriptive power that the names of the people they refer to have.
74. **A presupposition** is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance.
75. **Speakers**, not sentences, **have a presupposition**.

76. **An entailment** is something that logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance.
77. **Sentences**, not speakers, **have entailments**.
78. *Mary's brother bought three horses.* **has a lot of money** is presupposition
79. All of these presuppositions are the speaker's and all of them **can be wrong**, in fact.
80. *Mary's brother bought three horses* as having the **entailments** that: Mary's brother **bought** something, **bought three animals**, **bought three horses**, and **many other similar** logical consequences. These
81. **Existential Presupposition** is the assumption of the **existence of the entities** named by the speaker. e.g. "Tom's **car** is new" (we can presuppose that 'Tom' exists and that he has a car).
82. **Factive Presupposition** is the assumption that **something is true due to the presence of some verbs** such as "know", "realize" and "glad", etc.
83. **Non Factive Presupposition** refers to something that is **not true**.
84. **Lexical Presupposition** is an assumption that, in using one word, the speaker can act as another meaning (word).
85. **Structural Presupposition** - associated with the use of certain structures, e.g. **Wh-question** constructions.
86. **Counterfactual Presupposition** is an assumption that what is presupposed is **not only untrue** but is the **opposite of what is true**, or contrary to facts.
87. However, the meaning of some presuppositions (as parts) doesn't survive to become the meaning of some complex sentences (as wholes), this is known as **projection problem**.
88. Crystal (1998: 136) defines **entailment** as "a term refers to a **relation between a pair of sentences** such that the truth of the second sentence necessarily follows from the truth of the first
89. Generally speaking, **entailment is not a pragmatic concept**, because it has nothing to do with the speaker's intended meaning.
90. Speech act theory is similar to **physical acts**.
91. Speech acts are **acts of communication** (such as an apology, complaint, compliment etc.)
92. Speaker and hearer are usually helped in this process by the context called **speech events**; determine the interpretation of an utterance as performing a particular speech act.
93. **Explicit performatives** are performative utterances that contain a **performative verb** that makes explicit what kind of act is being performed and tend **to begin with a first person singular 'I'**
94. **Implicit performatives** are performative utterances in which there is **no such verb**.

95. **Constatives** – are the **statements** that attempt to describe **reality** and can be judged true or false.
96. J. L. Austin introduced, especially the notions "**locutionary act**", "**illocutionary act**", and "**perlocutionary act**", occupied an important role in what was then to become the "study of speech acts".
97. Searle (1976), proposed that all acts fall into **five** main types
98. **Representatives** commit the speakers to the truth of the expressed proposition – state what the speaker believes to be the case or not 'The earth is flat'. (**statement of fact**).
99. **Directives** are attempts by the speaker to get the addressee to do something – what the speaker wants (**requesting, questioning**).
100. **Commissives** commit the speaker to some future course of action – what s/he intends (**promising, threatening, offering, refusing**).
101. **Expressives** express a psychological state or what a speaker feels (**thanking, apologizing, welcoming, congratulating**).
102. **Declarations** effect immediate changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on elaborate extra-linguistic institutions (marrying, declaring war, firing from employment). These speech acts change the world via their utterance.
103. When the speaker promises to do something, there are **two preparatory conditions**: First, the event will not happen by itself. Second, the event will have a beneficial effect.
104. **Distinction** between direct speech acts or indirect speech acts **is based on their structure**.
105. Whenever there is a **direct relationship between a structure and a function**, we have a direct speech act. Pass me the salt!
106. Whenever there is an **indirect relationship between a structure and a function**, we have an indirect speech act. : Can you pass me the salt
107. A declarative used to make a **statement is a direct** speech act, but used to make a **request is an indirect** speech act.
108. Indirect speech acts **constitute one of many forms of politeness**.
109. Speech acts and their linguistic realizations are **culturally bound**. The ways of expressing speech acts vary from country to country and from culture to culture.
110. Differences in speech acts can cause difficulties **cross-culturally**.
111. When we try to categorize utterances in terms of speech acts, we often find that there is '**overlap**'. That one utterance can fall into more than one macro- class.

112. Similarly, see incomplete sentences as: ‘But she didn’t do the – er – no’ does not fit neatly into any category of speech act.
113. Brown and Yule (1983) describe the ‘**transactional**’ functions and the ‘**interactional**’ function of language.
114. The ‘**transactional**’ is the function which language serves in the expression of content and the transmission of factual information.
115. The ‘**interactional**’ is the function involved in expressing social relations and personal attitudes, showing solidarity and maintaining social cohesion.
116. At the extreme end of the interactional is ‘**phatic communion**’ - language with no information content used purely to keep channels of communication open.
117. Brown and Yule pointed out that much of the everyday human interaction is characterized by the **primary interpersonal rather than the primarily transactional use of language.**
118. Politeness generally refers to the ideas like **being tactful, modest and nice to other people.**
119. In pragmatics, **politeness can be defined** as ‘showing awareness and consideration of another person’s face’ (Yule, 2010).
120. “Politeness means having or **showing good manners and respect** for the feelings of others” (Wehmeier 2000, p. 976).
121. According to Yule (2010), politeness can be treated as a **fixed concept**, as in the idea of ‘polite social behavior’, or **etiquette**, within a culture.
122. Within interaction, a specified type of politeness is at work, for which we need the concept of ‘**Face**’ – public self-image of a person – emotional and social sense of self that one expects everyone else to recognize.
123. Politeness may not always be a matter of words **but how you say them.**
124. **Face-threatening Act** is if you say something that **represents a threat to another person’s self-image**, that is called a face-threatening act, e.g. ‘Give me that paper’.
125. **Face-saving Act** gives the possibility that some action might be interpreted as a threat to another’s face, the speaker can say something to lessen the possible threat, e.g. ‘Could you pass me that paper’
126. (FTA) face-threatening act
127. FTAs are sometimes **unavoidable in conversation**; they can damage the face of the person spoken to because it opposes her wants or needs.
128. An FTA can be **either a positive or negative one and can damage the speaker or the hearer.**

129. **Positive face-threatening acts** are a direct challenge to the face of the listener. They contain an indifference to the listener's self-image and include things such as threats, insults, and belittling the listener.
130. **Negative face-threatening acts** occur when the speaker impinges on the listener's negative face. The speaker requires a verbal response or an action from the person s/he is addressing.
131. Under politeness theory, there is a **positive and a negative face**.
132. **Positive face** reflects the desire to have one's self-image approved of by others. It is the need to be connected, to belong, to be a member of the group whereas, here, negative doesn't mean 'bad'.
133. Negative is simply the opposite of 'positive'. **Negative face** is the need to be independent and free from imposition.
134. **Independence** refers to a person's right not to be dominated by others – to act with some sense of individuality or autonomy (e.g. by giving people options, by apologizing for interruptions, etc.).
135. **Involvement** refers to the need people have to be involved with others and to show this involvement – a person's right to be considered a normal, contributing, and supporting member of a society/group. (e.g. by agreeing with them, showing our interest in someone, etc.)
136. Politeness strategies will differ **depending on** whether a person is dealing with **another's positive or negative face**.
137. **Face and politeness vary** from society to society and culture to culture
138. **Off record** is when you decide to say something, you simply produce statement such as [b] Hmm, I wonder where I put my pen.
139. **Off record** statements are **not directly addressed to the other** and the other can act as if the statements have not even been heard by them as: [a] Uh, I forgot my pen.
140. **Indirect statement** involves the **speaker requesting something without directly asking the listener to do it**. The approach is more deferential and places the burden on the speaker. For example, a speaker might comment on something that needs to be done rather than asking the listener to do it directly. (I am sweating, indirect request to switch on the fan)
141. **Bald on-record** – where you can directly address the other as a means of expressing your needs. The most direct approach, using imperative forms is known as bald on record. For instance, a person is directly asked: [a] Give me a pen.
142. Bald on record forms may be followed by expressions like **'please' and 'would you?'** which serve to soften the demand and called **mitigating devices**.

143. Generally speaking, **bald on record expressions are associated with speech events** where the speaker assumes that he or she has power over the other (e.g. in military contexts) and can control the other's behavior with words.
144. A **positive politeness** strategy leads the **requester to appeal to a common goal, even friendship**, via expressions such as: [a] How about letting me use your pen?
145. **Negative politeness** is also used when speakers know they are impinging on a person's time and want to show respect. For example, stopping a person on the street for instance, to ask for directions requires negative politeness.
146. **Solidarity strategy** is the tendency to use positive politeness, emphasizing closeness between the speaker and the hearer. It will include personal information, use of nicknames, sometimes even abusive terms (particularly among males), and shared dialect or slang expressions.
147. A solidarity strategy will be marked **via inclusive terms such as 'we' and 'let's'**, for example in the party invitation as in: 'Come on, let's go to the party. Everyone will be there. We'll have fun'.
148. **Deference strategy** is the tendency to use negative politeness forms, emphasizing the hearer's right to freedom.
149. A deference strategy is involved in what is called '**formal politeness**'. It is **impersonal**, as if nothing is shared, and can include expressions that refer to neither the speaker nor the hearer e.g. 'Customers may not smoke here, sir'.
150. The language associated with deference strategy **emphasizes** the speaker's and hearer's **independence**.
151. **Pre-sequences** is an assumption says that face is **typically at risk when the other is involved** with it.
152. **Pre-request** is a way to avoid this risk. It can help to know the answer either with 'go-ahead' or a 'stop' response in these sentences (a) Him: Are you busy? (=pre-request), (b) Her: Oh, sorry. (=stop).
153. Moreover, children often use **pre-announcements** to check if their parents are willing to pay attention.
154. Politeness is a pragmatic phenomenon; it lies not in the form and the words themselves, but in their **function and the intended social meaning**.
155. If the speaker uses **more polite forms** than the context requires, **hearer might suspect** that there is an intention other than that of redressing a face-threatening act (FTA).

156. Another example of an **inappropriate use of polite forms** is the **man's request to his pet**, 'Cat, I wonder if you could possibly let me have my seat back?', meant to entertain whoever listens it.
157. **Politeness is not the same as deference**, which is a polite form expressing distance from and respect for people of a higher status.
158. **Deference** is rare to find it grammatically signaled in English, although it is present in **honorifics** such as '**Sir**' and '**Madam**'.
159. To Heritage (1984), a speaker's action is context-shaped in that its contribution to an ongoing sequence of actions cannot be understood **except by reference to the context**.
160. The choice of the politeness formulation depends on the social distance and the power relation between speakers.
161. When there is **social distance, politeness is encoded and there is more indirectness**.
162. When there is **less social distance, there is less negative politeness** and indirectness.
163. **Variables** that determine social distance are: *degree of familiarity and differences of status, roles, age, gender, education, class, occupation and, ethnicity*.
164. The degree of familiarity is that **speakers know each other, do not need to use politeness strategies**; if they use them, it can imply quite opposite of politeness.
165. **Expressions with bald on record** are used by people who assume that they have got power.
166. According to Tannen (1994), the use of indirectness **can hardly be understood without** the cross-cultural perspective'.
167. In Cuba, friends **should not show any distance at all**, and to say 'thank you' for a cup of coffee, 'maximizing praise of other', can cause offense as it appears to put up barriers.
168. Thomas (1995) mentions that **Chinese hosts** will choose a **guest's menu** for them and put the 'choicest pieces' on their plate, to show **positive politeness**.
169. **Conversational analysis** looks at ordinary everyday spoken discourse and aims to understand how people manage their interactions.
170. **Conversational analysis** is the study of **social interaction embracing both verbal and non-verbal** conduct in everyday life.
171. Conversational analysis is a **rigorous investigation of features of a conversation**, how it is generated and constructed, how it operates, what its distinguishing features are, and how participants construct their own meanings in the conversational situation. Conversations are multi-layered/multi-leveled.

172. **Conversational analysis** examines different levels of meaning within a text. It also looks at the contents, sequence, evolution and, forms of the conversation.
173. In **Conversational analysis**, we study how speakers decide when to speak during a conversation, how the utterances of two are related, and different functions that conversation is used for.
174. Features of conversational analysis include, **turn-taking, pauses, overlaps and backchannels, adjacency pairs, preference structures, and sequences expansion.**
175. **Turn-taking** operates in accordance with a local management system that is conventionally known by the members of a social group. This system is essentially a set of conventions for getting turns, keeping them, or giving them away; it is needed most at those points where there is a possible change in who has the turn.
176. **Turn-taking** can be applied to conversations where speakers **cooperate and share the floor equally**. Also be applied to conversations where there is competition, fighting to keep the floor and preventing others from getting it.
177. Moreover, **different cultures have their own preferences** as to how long a speaker should hold the floor, how they indicate that they have finished and another speaker can take the floor.
178. Latin Americans have pauses of a **fraction of a second** and it is socially acceptable to overlap and interrupt
179. North American Indians expect a **two-second** pause between turns,
180. For **Japanese**, it is **unacceptable to interrupt**.
181. When two people attempt to have a conversation and discover that there is no ‘flow’, or smooth rhythm to their transition, much more is being communicated than is said; there is a sense of distance, an absence of familiarity or ease.
182. In accordance with the local management system, **one speaker will stop to allow the other** to have the floor.
183. **Backchannels** are head nods, smiles and other facial expressions and gestures that indicate that hearer is listening.
184. These types of signals (uh – uh, yeah, mmm) **provide feedback to the current speaker** that the message is being received; known as backchannel signals or simply backchannels.
185. ‘A sequence of two related utterances by two different speakers’ is known as **adjacency pairs**.
186. The **second utterance is always a response to the first**. For instance: [A: You left the light on.], [B: It wasn’t me!], [the sequence of complaint-denial = **is an adjacency pair**].

187. **Types of Adjacency** pairs are question-answer, greeting-greeting, Invitation or offer-acceptance/non-acceptance, complaint-apology/denial, summons-response, request-acceptance, promise or thanks-acknowledgement, and goodbye-goodbye.
188. An **insertion sequence** is one adjacency pair within another; a number of insertion sequences can be infinite, but the limit of human memory does not allow that.
189. **Delay** in response marks potential unavailability of the immediate expected answer; it represents the distance between what is expected and what is provided.
190. A first part that contains a request or an offer has an expectation that the second part will be an acceptance; structurally more likely than refusal. This structural likelihood is called **preference**.
191. Technically, **preference** is an observed pattern in talk and not a personal wish.
192. Preference structure **divides second parts into preferred** (structurally expected next act) and dis-preferred (structurally unexpected next act) social acts.
193. Conversation analysts claim that as speakers are mutually constructing and negotiating their conversation in time, certain sequences, which are stretches of utterances or turns, emerge. These can be pre-sequences, **insertion sequences, and opening and closing sequences**.
194. **Pre-sequences** are the opening sequences that are used to set up some specific potential actions. Conversations are opened in socially recognized ways. In the beginning of the conversation speakers normally greet each other,
195. **Greetings exemplify opening sequences**, utterances that ease people into a conversation. They convey the message “I want to talk to you”.
196. There are **pre-invitations** (I’ve got two tickets for the football match), pre-requests (are you busy right now?) and pre-announcements (You’ll never guess!).
197. **Cross cultural pragmatics** is a subfield of pragmatics.
198. Kasper and Blum-Kulka (1993) defined **CCP** as the study of linguistic acts by language users from different cultural backgrounds.
199. Cross-cultural pragmatics aims at understanding the extent to which **non-shared knowledge** or in simple terms our schemas affect or modify the retrieval of intended meaning.
200. CCP looks at **issues outside classrooms** and concentrates on environments where participants are not explicitly learners, but rather full members of the target language community.

201. In pragmatics, “culture” is not Culture, with a capital C – that is, the literature, music, and art. Rather, it is culture as a **reflection of the values and beliefs** about the world, held by the members of a community which forms, in effect, the substratum of their everyday life.
202. **CCP** investigates how human behavior is translated into instances of language in use.
203. Research has shown that a speaker’s intended meaning, mediated by linguistic symbols, **may be interpreted or misinterpreted in cross-cultural contexts** due to each interactant’s own norms of interpretation.
204. CCP examines behaviors that are manifest or overt and others that are latent or covert. The values and beliefs are embedded in talk **both at the micro and the macro level**.
205. **Micro features** include prosodic cues, turn taking, indirectness, nonverbal cues, etc.
206. **Intercultural pragmatics** is based on the socio-cognitive approach according to which, our mind exists simultaneously both in the head and in the world.
207. **Cross-cultural** comparative studies of discourse have shown that rules of appropriateness vary across cultures.
208. Modern language courses include elements of ‘**communicative competence**’ (Hymes, 1964); providing them with knowledge about and experience in using the sociocultural rules of the new language.
209. Intercultural pragmatics studies **speech acts across various cultures** to study how language is manifested in a society and is a medium of differentiation between different cultures.
210. The difference in culture causes a number of intercultural failures such as **socio-pragmatic failure and pragma-linguistic failure**.
211. The **interlanguage** is a reduced system at the early stages of development.
212. **Interlanguage** refers to intermediate, dynamic, and transient linguistic systems that, according to the theory, continue to develop over time as learners move closer and closer to attaining native-like proficiency.
213. ILP stands for Interlanguage pragmatics.
214. ILP is essentially interested in how L2 learners use their developing abilities in L2 to communicate successfully despite gaps in their knowledge and socio-pragmatics of the L2.
215. Erickson and Schultz (1982) found that African-American students displayed attention and listenership in less overt ways than those expected by the white counselors, even when there were no gender differences.

216. Listener cues are also called “back channel cues”.
217. Cues are believed to be given by the listener while the speaker, often in the context of telling a story or narrating recent events (Yngve 1970).
218. **Cultural values** are attached to cues more explicitly in one culture than another. E.g. Japanese culture does transparently discuss the need for the listener to “chime in” in a patterned manner.
219. **Computer-Assisted Language Learning (CALL)** is defined as “the search for and study of applications of the computer in language teaching and learning.” (Levy, 1997: 1).
220. **Computational Linguistics** on the other hand, is the study of language from a computational perspective.
221. CL is concerned with the study of **computer systems** for understanding and generating natural language (Grisham, 1986).
222. The process of dictionary making today is undergoing dramatic change. It is largely owing to advances in computers and the availability of machine-readable collections of texts known as **corpora**.
223. **Corpus linguistics** is the term used for compiling collections of texts and using them to probe language use. In this context, a corpus is a representative body of texts.
224. (corpus is the **Latin word** for ‘body’).
225. More recent corpora contain over **100 million** words, and corpora of texts in many languages are being compiled.
226. **Computerized corpora** are useful to dictionary makers and others in establishing patterns of language that are not apparent from mere introspection. For example, patterns of collocation - which words go together - are much more readily understood with the help of a computerized corpus of natural-language texts. Such patterns can be helpful in highlighting meanings, parts of speech, and words that co-occur with frequency.
227. Further, while it may appear that synonymous words can be used in place of one another, **corpora** can show that it is not common for words to be readily substitutable for one another.
228. **KWIC** stand for key word in context.
229. little and small, big and large, and fast and quick are generally considered synonyms. But a cursory examination of **key word in context (KWIC)** concordances for these pairs shows that they are not straightforwardly substitutable.
230. **Corpora** help us understand the meaning and use of words.

231. interlingual translation model require **twelve procedures for 6 languages**- one decoding procedure and one encoding procedure for each of the six languages.
232. transfer translation model that **30 procedures for 6 languages (6 × 5 – 30)**. Each one language to other five languages.
233. As compared to morphological, lexical, phonological, grammatical, and semantic features of texts, the features of pragmatics have been less well explored in **computational linguistics**.
234. Especially in recent years, machine-readable texts initially published as books, magazines, and newspapers have been widely available, as is the Web.
235. There are ways to develop corpora through different methods, for instance: scanners can effectively transform many older printed materials into machine-readable text.
236. **British National Corpus** is based on speech. About one **hundred volunteers** throughout Britain carried recorders in a course
237. In language texts, such highlighting and deemphasizing is called **information structure**. Unlike syntax and semantics, which are sentence-based aspects of language, information structure requires consideration of discourse - coherent sequences of sentences rather than isolated ones.
238. **Given information** is information currently in the forefront of an addressee's mind. New information is information just being introduced into the discourse.
239. Alina: [Who ate the biscuits?], [Maria: Hassan ate the biscuits.] In Maria's answer, the noun phrase '**Hassan**' represents new information, '**the biscuits**' in the reply is given information
240. **Given information** can be realized in sentences in condensed form, e.g. instead of saying Hassan ate the biscuits, the speaker could simply say Hassan did, Hassan did it, or Hassan.
241. The **topic** of a sentence is its center of attention - **what it is about** and its point of departure. The notion of the topic is contrasted with the notion of **comment**, which is the **element of a sentence** that says something about the topic.
242. **Given information** in the sentence about which we say something, called the **topic**; **new information** shows what we say about the topic, called the **comment**.
243. **Contrast** is a noun phrase is said to be contrastive when it occurs in opposition to another noun phrase in the discourse. For example, Alan: Did Matt see the accident? Beth: No, Sara did. Here, **Sara in Beth's answer is contrasted with Matt in Alan's question**. The contrast of Beth's answer with another possible one in which the noun phrase would not be contrastive: Yes, he did.

244. Among other reasons, speakers mark a noun phrase as ‘**definite**’ when they assume that the **addressee can identify its referent**. Otherwise, the noun phrase is marked as indefinite.
245. For instance, Andrea: Who’s at the door? Bundy: It’s **the** neighbor. In this example, the **definite** noun phrase ‘the neighbor’ in Bundy’s answer presupposes that Andrea can determine which neighbor Bundy is talking about. Bundy’s answer is appropriate if she and Andrea have only one neighbor or have reason to expect a particular neighbor at the door. If they have several neighbors and Bundy cannot assume that Andrea will be able to identify which neighbor is at the door, the answer to Andrea’s question would be **indefinite**: It’s **a** neighbor.
246. **Proper nouns and pronouns** are generally definite. Pronouns such as ‘you’ and ‘we’ usually refer to individuals who are identifiable in the discourse context.
247. **Definiteness** in English is marked by the choice of articles (definite ‘**the**’ versus indefinite ‘a’) or by demonstratives (**this and that, both definite**).
248. **Indefinite noun phrases** in English are marked by **a or an** (a furnace, an apartment building) or by the absence of any article (oil, fire, apartment buildings).
249. **Generic sentences** express **generalizations** about kinds and are an important tool for the transmission of knowledge (Gelman, 2003): Tigers are striped.
250. A **noun phrase may be generic** or specific depending on whether it refers to a **category** or to particular **members of a category**.
251. In Collecting Data for Pragmatic Analysis all the non-relevant variables need to be **eliminated**.
252. **Conventional transcriptions** of conversations use a standard orthographic script rather than phonemic transcription.
253. **Conversational strategies** show how does turn-taking work – in general terms and in a particular conversation?
254. The units of conversation are **insertion sequences, adjacency pairs, pre-sequences**.
255. **Activity types** and the institutional use of language: the structure and pragmatic properties of seminars, interviews, etc. also talk types: the structure of telephone conversations, ordering sequences in restaurants, contributions to radio phone-ins, etc. To what extent these speech events are goal-oriented? And to what extent do they determine their own structures? How is talk constrained and how do participants indicate constraints on allowable contributions?

256. **Focusing on power and distance**, ‘relation indicating devices’ (Matsumoto, 1988): how speakers encode these; how speakers get their own way. Face work- how speakers use politeness strategies to acknowledge the face wants of others.
257. **Intercultural pragmatics**: How members of different cultural groups accommodate and react to socio-pragmatic differences.
258. **Context**: Does the external social structure determine the way talk is organized and the type of contributions that occur, or is the context created by the talk itself?
259. **Folk views of talk**: Investigating the extent to which people’s beliefs about pragmatic uses of language (politeness and interruption, etc.) are oriented to in the talk.
260. Grundy made some comments about ways of learning pragmatics by doing the **data-driven pragmatic analysis**.
261. **Ambiguity** is a sequence of linguistic signs (written, spoken or signed) is ambiguous if and only if it is assigned more than one meaning by the grammar. In other words, ambiguous expressions are expressions that have more than one meaning in the language.
262. **Structural ambiguity** is due to the syntactic structure of the utterance, as in: They are fighting fish (Nicholas Allott, 1988).
263. **Lexical ambiguity** that occurs when one form corresponds to more than one words with different meanings, like ‘bank’ in I pass the bank on the way to work.
264. **Disambiguation** is the process of selecting the intended sense of an ambiguous word, phrase or sentence from among the senses allowed by the grammar. Disambiguation is largely unconscious and automatic, and most of the ambiguity, therefore goes unnoticed by the speaker or the hearer.
265. **Vagueness** is a vague meaning is one that is not clearly defined
266. In relevance theory, **attributive use of a concept** is where a word or phrase is used to express a concept that a speaker attributes to someone else and which she need not endorse herself. A concept used in this way is sometimes called an attributive concept.
267. **Attributive** use is a type of interpretive use: specifically, it is interpretive use in which there is attribution of a thought or utterance to another. For example, ‘An amazing thought entered into my brain’, **Amazing is an attribute of thought**.
268. **Argumentation Theory**: The systematic study of discourse that is intended to persuade rationally, including the study of logical arguments and fallacies and their uses.

269. Argumentation theory is a **sub-field** of pragmatics since persuading by the use of arguments is one use of language, i.e. Media communication.
270. Argumentation theorists also investigate **normative as well as descriptive** aspects of language use.
271. **Referential /Attributive Distinction** is a distinction between two apparently different ways of using definite descriptions, made by the philosopher Keith Donnellan (Allott, 1988).
272. One way of using a definite description is to talk about whichever individual (or individuals, for plural definite descriptions) satisfies the material in the nominal restrictor. **This is the attributive use.**
273. Another way of using a **definite description** is to pick out and talk about a certain individual (or individuals, for plural definite descriptions).
274. **Code Model** is a model of communication according to which communication involves the transmission of meaning – the message – by encoding it in language or some other codes.
275. **Communicative Competence** is the ability to communicate in a language. It includes competence with the grammatical forms of the language and the ability to put forms of the language to use in communication (Allott, 1988). This term was invented by the **anthropologist and sociolinguist Dell Hymes.**
276. A speaker should have the competence to talk to a **lady, old man, a professional differently.** This is communicative competence how perfectly you answer after analyzing the situation!
277. A group of **indexical words** or phrases that are used to refer, include this, that, these and those (in English). These words are used to make **demonstrative phrases**, for example, this pen, that car, these keys, those penguins (Allott, 1988).
278. Demonstratives are often **accompanied by a gesture** that demonstrates the object referred to, pointing, or gazing at the object, i.e. ‘that boy’.
279. As with other indexical, the **referent of a demonstrative must be worked out to know what proposition the speaker is expressing.** The particular demonstrative used restricts the search for referents, in subtle ways.
280. If there is one book on a table the speaker may refer to it with ‘this book’ or ‘that book’, But if it is the **nearer of two, then ‘this book’ is preferred**, except **if** both books are nearer the hearer, when again ‘that book’ is acceptable.
281. In **English and other languages**, the demonstratives encode a **two-way proximal/distal distinction**, but other languages have a **three way or four-way** distinction.

282. For space deixis, demonstratives are frequently used for discourse deixis, as in: “I am glad you told me that” and “This is what I’ll be talking about today”.
283. When linguistic material is missing from the pronounced form of a phrase or sentence, that phrase/sentence is said to be (syntactically) **elliptical**.
284. Mary kicked John, and Jane, Bill. Here the verb ‘**kicked**’ has been **ellipted**.
285. The term ‘**folk pragmatics**’ is modeled on **folk physics** are pre-theoretical expectations about heat, light, how objects move, etc. (Allott, 1988).
286. Folk psychology is **pre-theoretical expectations** about how behavior relates to thoughts and aims.
287. **Formal Pragmatics** is the study of pragmatic phenomena using techniques and notations from logic and mathematics.
288. **Formal pragmatics** is largely an extension from formal, model-theoretic semantics into the domain of more context sensitive elements of speaker meaning (Allott, 1988).
289. Formal pragmatics serves **two important** functions in Habermas’s philosophy.
- First**, it is the theoretical underpinning of the theory of communicative action, this being a crucial element of his theory of society.
 - Second**, it contributes to ongoing philosophical discussions regarding truth, meaning, rationality and action. (Philosophymasters.com).
290. In **Experimental Pragmatics**, the application of experimental techniques largely forms psycholinguistics to the areas of interest in pragmatics. Techniques used include on-line measures and off-line measures.
291. **On-line measures** contain eye-tracking and timed responses to stimuli and **off-line measures** such as the choice from a set of candidates of the best sentence to describe a scene.
292. **Experimental pragmatics** is a very recent development, although existing psycholinguistic work on disambiguation, semantic illusions and other aspects of interpretation is relevant (Allott, 1988).
293. According to Bruno G. Bara (2010), **Cognitive pragmatics** focuses on the mental states and, to some extent, the mental correlates of the participants of a conversation.
294. The mental processes of human communication are based on **three** fundamental concepts: **cooperation, sharedness, and communicative intention**.
295. These three fundamentals were **proposed by Grice in 1975**, though each has since been refined by other scholars.

296. The cooperative nature of communication is justified by the evolutionary perspective through which the cooperative reasoning underlying a conversation is explained.
297. **Sharedness** accounts for the possibility of comprehending non-standard communication such as deceit, irony, and figurative language (Bruno G. Bara, 2010).
298. Linguistic material that is less than a complete sentence is called a **fragment**.
299. **Fragments** are **generally**, although **not always**, **linguistic constituents**: preposition phrases, noun phrases and so on.
300. Fragments can be used to **express complete propositions** (Allott, 1988). For example, a speaker uttering “On the top shelf” might mean: The jar is on the top shelf.
301. **Metaphor** is a type of figurative speech. Typically, a metaphor ascribes to an entity a property that it does not, strictly and literally speaking, possess, although not all metaphors fit this definition.
302. **Metaphors** are not restricted to any particular type of word or phrase (Allott, 1988).
303. The metaphorical element of a sentence **can be a noun phrase**, as in ‘John is an iceberg.’
304. **Verbs** can also be used metaphorically, as in ‘Flintoff drilled the ball to the boundary.’
305. **Synecdoche** is a figure of speech in which an expression that denotes the part of something is used to refer to the whole. For example, ‘mouth’ in ‘I’ve got six hungry mouths to feed’
306. The term ‘**synecdoche**’ is sometimes also regarded as including the use of an expression denoting a smaller class to refer to a larger class, and for the converse situation.
307. Many cases of **polysemy** are regarded as related through synecdoche. One example is the two senses of ‘**chicken**’: the type of **bird**, and the **meat** (Allott, 1988).
308. **Hyperbole** is a figure of speech also known as an overstatement, in which a speaker expresses an exaggerated meaning than his words carry in themselves. ‘I am starving’
309. On a Gricean analysis, **hyperbole** is a blatant violation of the first maxim of quality.
310. **Irony** is a figure of speech seen in the following example: Alistair (stepping out into heavy rain): Another lovely day! (**opposite of intended**.. when you are in heavy rain it could not be a lovely day)
311. The **classical conception** of irony is that it is a figure of speech in which the speaker means the **opposite** of what her words mean.
312. In neo-Gricean pragmatics, the **I principle** or Informativeness-principle is one of a small number of principles that govern communicative behaviour.
313. The **I-principle** enjoins speakers to say as little as necessary (while bearing in mind the opposing Q-principle).

314. If a speaker's utterance appears to be governed by the I-principle, then the hearer can take it that the speaker expressed herself economically.
315. In neo-Gricean pragmatics, the **M-principle** or Manner principle is one of a small number of heuristics (approach to problem solving or self-discovery) governing communicative behaviour.
316. A brief formulation of the M-principle in terms of instructions to speaker and hearer is as follows:
Speaker: Do not say things in an abnormal way without reason. Addressee: What is said in an abnormal way indicates an abnormal situation.
317. In neo-Gricean pragmatics, the **Q principle** or Quantity Principle is one of a small number of principles thought to govern communicative behaviour and the production of implicatures. Q-principle is: Make your contribution sufficient; Say as much as you can (Given R).
318. In Neo-Gricean pragmatics, the **R principle** or 'Relation-principle' is one of the small set of principles which govern communicative behaviour. On one formulation, the R-principle is: Make your contribution necessary; Say no more than you must (given the Q-principle). The R-principle enjoins the speaker to minimize the amount of linguistic material uttered, or more generally to minimize the effort involved in speech. It is, therefore, described as an 'upper-bounding' principle.
319. In relevance theory, **manifestness** is the degree to which an assumption is accessible in a context on the basis of perception or of inference.
320. An **assumption** is manifest to a given individual whether he is capable to make an assumption about false or true. The assumption need not, in fact, to be true: false assumptions can be entertained as true.
321. Therefore, **manifestness** is a weaker notion than knowledge. **Manifestness** is a matter of degree. The more likely an assumption is to be entertained, the more highly manifest it is (Allott, 1988).
322. **Mutual-Manifestness** is a **shared cognitive environment** in which it is manifest which people share is a mutual cognitive environment.
323. **Markedness** is the extent to which an item in a language is out-of-the-ordinary. Unmarked items are normal, whereas marked items are relatively unusual.
324. In Austin's work, a **misfire** is one of the two ways in which a speech act can be unsuccessful.
325. **Prosody** is a variation in the rhythm, stress, and intonation of speech at the level of utterances, rather than at the lexical level.

326. The interaction of prosody with **syntactic structure**, and the effect that prosody has on the interpretation of utterances are not well understood in general. For example, the difference in **stress** between ‘**REcord**’ (the noun) and ‘**reCORD**’ (the verb) is **not a prosodic** difference.
327. But the difference in **stress positions in the following examples is prosodic**: Alice eats GRASS.
Alice EATS grass.
328. **Tautology** is a statement that expresses a proposition that is necessarily true is called a tautology. For example: [2 + 2 = 4], [War is war.], [If it rains, it rains.].
329. **John Langshaw Austin**, author of a book, ‘How to Do Things with Words’, focuses on actions that can be performed with language apart from making statements, and effectively founded speech act theory.
- a. **John Langshaw Austin** has given three justifications for this approach (Allott, 1988). First, how to use words? Secondly, words are distinct from the facts and things they are used to talk about. The third justification is that our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing.
330. Austin preferred to see **all utterances as performative**, including such apparent constatives as assertions and statements (Allott, 1988).
331. **Noam Avram Chomsky** has said that there is no such thing as semantics, only syntax, and pragmatics, and has been taken to suggest that a theory of language use is an impossibility since it would have to be a theory of everything.
332. Fundamental of Chomskyan linguistics is a **distinction between competence**, what is (unconsciously) known about language, and performance, what is done with that knowledge.
333. **Generative Grammar is also a term introduced by Noam Chomsky**. This work on the nature and acquisition of grammar has to be supplemented with an account of the acquisition of individual lexical items. Such as the word ‘cat’ somehow links the speech sounds /kæt/ to a certain concept.
334. He thinks; pragmatics, systematic study of the use of language, is **pointless or impossible**.
335. **Herbert Paul Grice** had the greatest influence on the development of pragmatics. Two connected parts of Grice’s work have been profoundly influential in the field: his theory of meaning and his theory of conversation.
336. Grice introduces his **distinction between natural and non-natural meaning** by way of a bit of ‘linguistic botanizing’ (as he later described this characteristic move of the ordinary language style).
337. He notes that the words ‘**mean**’ and ‘**meaning**’ can be used in different ways (Allott, 1988).

338. One way is exemplified by expressions such as ‘Those spots mean measles.’ Grice calls this **natural** meaning.
339. The other use he finds in expressions such as ‘Those three rings on the bell mean that the bus is full.’ This is **non-natural** meaning.
340. **Stephen C. Levinson** describes politeness phenomena in the use of language which is largely responsible for the proliferation of cross linguistic and cross cultural studies of politeness in speech.
341. Levinson’s theory describes **two aspects of people’s face: negative** face and **positive** face.
342. **Levinson** introduces a term **Face Threatening Acts (FTAs)**. Positive politeness is directed towards the addressee’s positive face and negative politeness is directed towards the negative face of the addressee (Allott, 1988).
343. Levinson argued that a **distinction** between **utterance-type** and **utterance-token** meaning is necessary to capture the facts about implicatures.
344. **Generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs)** are defined as those that are normally carried without any reference to the context (Allott, 1988).
345. **Particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs)**, on the other hand, require special circumstances: they are not conveyed just by a certain way of saying something, but the saying of it in a certain context.
346. According to Levinson, the I-principle and the M-principle also give **rise** to GCIs.
347. Levinson also explores possible connections between **default** interpretations and the **defeasible** inferences.
348. In ‘**Presumptive Meanings**’, Levinson also contributes to the ongoing debate about the linguistic under-determinacy of the proposition expressed.
349. **John Rogers Searle** is an **American** philosopher best known in pragmatics for his work on speech acts.
350. Word choice, prosody, tone of voice, degree of grammatical complexity, and interactional routines are **components of socio-pragmatics**.
351. Al-Issa (2003: 594) analyzed a conversation of three interviewees who used “**God willing**” (in Sha’Allah) in their English refusal responses (LoCastro, 2012).
352. Identity in an L2 context may be **problematic** for learners of the L2, **even in the foreign language learning environment**.

353. The word “**identity**” does not commonly come into the media talk, yet it is clearly part of the discourse, unexamined though it may be even by the participants.
354. **Menard-Warwick** (2009) states that resistance to learning develops when educational systems
355. The term “**gendered**” clearly communicates the notion that **gender is an action**, something that one does, i.e. gender in the media, in the workplace, in religion, and in the family (LoCastro, 2012).
356. To understand ‘Gender’ we need to consider that **how children acquire an awareness** of gender at very early ages.
357. Female children learn that pink is the color for girls. This starts as **nonverbal cues** of femaleness translates into differences in language use.
358. Tannen (1993) claimed that, though there is no question that dominance by men of women exists, it is **not possible to attribute the cause of the enactment of dominance to specific linguistic realizations**, For example, indirectness, interruptions, or topic shifts (LoCastro, 2012).
359. LoCastro (2012) highlights a speech variable found in an individual’s speech in Australia and the U.K., i.e. women may **drop their h’s**. The practice of h-dropping occurs in everyday words like ’ouse (house), ’ome (home), Trudgill (1972) and Milroy (1989).
360. In Western cultural contexts, stereotypically, it is men who are viewed as being more likely to **dominate** in mixed-gender groupings.
361. In Japan, women use “**Respectful Prefixes**” known as honorifics which are based on ‘politeness’ in a formal context (Maynard, 1990).
362. According to Ide and Inoue (1991), Japanese women of higher social status tend to use more **elaborated honorifics to signal beauty, grace, and dignity**.
363. Ide (2005) uses the term “**beautification**” honorifics, a form of gendered language use that, in her view, does not correlate with dominance in Japan.
364. It has been observed in India and Pakistan that English is used as a **dominant language** in the elite class which shows that this class is influenced by western culture.
365. **Errington** states that language is sometimes “**gender-neutral**” in **Asian Culture**.
366. Examples of the gender-neutral features are: The **lack of gender marking with articles**, or morphemes on nouns; specific lexemes like “human” or “person” are not marked for feminine or masculine. The local greeting is how many “older and younger siblings do you have” rather than how many “brothers and sisters do you have” (Atkinson and Errington 1990).

367. According to LoCastro (2012) **power** has a role to play in any consideration of gender, race, ethnicity, and class.
368. Keating (2009) defines power “**as the ability or capacity to perform or act effectively**; to exert control over others” (LoCastro, 2012).
369. **Language** can play a great role in producing and reproducing the underlying structures of power and control in a society (LoCastro, 2012).
370. Some **variables** as gender, age, social class, and race cannot be ignored (LoCastro, 2012). Individuals cannot be free of the wider social, political, and economic pressures from dominant beliefs and practices that continue to stereotype one gender or the other. For example, women as being more polite than men, or associate an aggressive speech style as typical only of men (LoCastro, 2012).
371. **Political discourse** is a genre of language in use which is often viewed as a transparent vehicle used by politicians to preserve or to seek to create their own power.
372. Speech of **president of a country** is supposed to maintain the face of the speaker as the main governmental leader of the country LoCastro 2012).
373. The study of language and power also looks at how **linguistic structures create reality**, a reality that maintains and extends power relations in a society.
374. The study of language and power is often designated as **CDA** (LoCastro, 2012).
375. According to LoCastro (2012), **pragmatic competence** for second language learners is important even more than acquiring high linguistic proficiency in the L2.
376. **Pragmatic Competence** helps the learners to use the correct phrases in a particular situation.
377. According to LoCastro (2012), during learning, the learners **should be** given a chance to bring in **personal experience** and make **connections with the real world** of conversational interactions
378. LoCastro (2012) has focused on instructed development, that is, in classrooms, or other contexts organized for learning, as the acquisition of pragmatic competence in a **naturalistic environment**.
379. Kasper and Rose (2002) argue that **L2 pragmatics can be taught**.
380. According to Kanaggy (1999), the **children in Japan are taught the cultural practices** and the pragmatic meanings of the routines in classrooms including **nonverbal behaviors**.
381. Children **cannot learn** to say “thank you” **without an adult** in their immediate environment instructing them about the phrase and its context of use.

- 382. **Local teachers** can teach pragmatic competence in a **better way** because, sometimes, native speakers of the target language may shy away from making learners aware of miscommunication due to local sociocultural influences (Kasper and Rose, 2002).
- 383. According to LoCastro (2012), it is particularly difficult for **non-native** teachers to develop pragmatic competence in a foreign language context.
- 384. McKay (2002) lists **three** reasons the ELT field has had to revise its goals and teachers their practices:
 - a. Learners of English as a second/foreign language do not have to also learn the cultures of native speakers of English;
 - b. English is not “owned” by native speakers only.
 - c. The main goal of learners is to communicate their own ideas and cultures to others, not become native speakers of the language.
- 385. According to LoCastro (2012), teachers do not take the pain to develop pragmatic competence because they are non-natives and have not experienced the environment of the target language.
- 386. If ESL teachers are given a chance of **one- or two-months training abroad in that environment**, they can be beneficial for the learners.